The Basic Concepts On Distribution of Decision Power Between The Players and Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games
It is known that voting is a widely used method in social choice theory. In the present paper we consider some concepts of distribution of voting powers between the player and the process of manipulation in weighted voting games. The aim is to show some basic problems in social choice theory by studying the decision powers of players and the three processes of manipulation in weighted voting games: by merging of two players into a single player, by players splitting into a number of smaller units, and by annexation of a part or all of the voting weights of another player.
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