The Separation of Property and Control and its Costs a Century-Old Problem that Seems Modern

  • José G. Vargas-Hernández Núcleo universitario Los Belenes, Jalisco, México
  • Yoeslandy García Marsilio
Keywords: Agency, agents, control, costs, monitoring, principals


The Agency Costs resulting from the conflict between principals and agents, due to the separation of ownership and control in the capitalist enterprise, was analyzed in many works of the last century. Could we assume that the current globalization of companies has increased the differences between principals and agents? Does this scenario lead to an increase in Agency Costs in those companies with the greatest presence in the global economy? The objective of this article is to compile studies that will allow us to answer these questions affirmatively and conclude that large transnational, multinational or global companies involve higher Agency Costs than those that remain within national borders.

Author Biographies

José G. Vargas-Hernández, Núcleo universitario Los Belenes, Jalisco, México

Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas. Universidad de Guadalajara

Periférico Norte 799 Edif. G201-7, Núcleo universitario Los Belenes, Zapopan, Jalisco, 45100, México

Yoeslandy García Marsilio

Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico-Administrativas.  Universidad de Guadalajara Estudiante de Maestría en Negocios y Estudios Económicos Prolongación Mariano Bárcenas Nº 435 Entre González Ortega y Paloma. No. Int. 26. Hogares del Batán Zapopan, Jalisco, C.P. 45190, México.


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